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ACOXSTAXT feature that characterizes all the diverse philo-
sophical systems of India resides in their approach to the
tasks oi nietaph\sical interpretation. This approach is identical with
the persistent emphasis of the religious consciousness. It centers
about the interrelations of the self and the world. Professor
Leidecker has lent his authority to the contention that a "unifying
theme that runs through all the systems is that of expressing ex-
l)erience in terms of the relation between the world and the self.^
In this respect we find the contemporary philosophical situation in
the West sharj)lv different. Our behaviorisms, positivisms, natural-
isms, most realisms, and speculative philosophy, however wide their
(lef)artures from one another, alike manifest an objective orientation
in cou'-equence of which the relation between the world and the self
is at most one of the (luestions that arise in the endeavor to frame
a conception of reality under the lead of science, and only certain
of these philosophies manifest any temptation to express experience
in terms of this relation.
In raising the issue of differences between India and the con-
tem])orary West as concerns the influence of the religious conscious-
ness upon philosoph}'. however, it was our intention to stress other
matters—features connected with the lines of consideration men-
tioned in our preceding paper. First of all we would allude to a
conception which is prominent in the thought of India, and enters
into all its philosophic svstems except the Carvaka, but which, in the
specific form in which it there occurs, is all but absent from our con-
temporar\' Western philosophies. That to which we refer is the
doctrine of Karma ; and that feature of this doctrine which we would
here single out for attention is its unqualified synthesis of ])ov\er,
on the one hand, with justice or goodness, on the other. Xeither of
the-e traits would the Hindu consciousness sacrifice, even when con-
fronted with the hard ])roblems of human fate. Both in quality and
' Leidecker. Kurt V.. "Indian Philosophy and Western Thought," Jounuii
of the hitcnilioiiiil SclincI nf Vcdic and Allied Research. \'ol. 1, No. 1. p. IS,
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in intensity, the teaching goes, the vicissititudes and fortunes of Hfe
are resuhants of earher deeds—a thesis which carries with it the
doctrine of previous existence. Indeed, according to Garbe, the
effects of human action are held to carry far bexond the experience
of the individual agents. The "subsequent etTectiveness of guilt and
of merit, usually called adrishta, 'the invisible,' also often simply
kanjiOH. 'deed, work,' not only determines the measure of happiness
and suffering which falls to the lot of each individual, but also de-
termines the origin and evolution of all things in the universe. At
bottom this last thought is only a necessary consequence of the
theory that every being is the architect of its own fate and fortunes
into the minutest details; for whatever comes to pass in the world,
some creature is inexitabh" affected li\' it and must, tlierefore, b\
the law of atonement ha^e brought about the event by his previous
acts. The operations of nature, therefore, are the effects of the good
and bad actions of living beings. On these assumptions all Indian
philosophx', with the exception of materialism, is founded.- This
account may not meet with universal approval on the part of
scholars. Yet what does seem indisputable is the basic position in
Indian thought of the belief in the inse]~)arabi]it\- of power, order
and justice.
\\'e find a characteristic, e\en though but a relative, distinction
tietween Indian and contemporary Western, and esi)eciall\ Ameri-
can, thought, also in the fact that the former has always manifested
an exce]itional preoccupation with that whole or totalit\' within
which all elements of being are felt or conceived to fall. This means,
in part, that it has exhibited a ])r()nounced tendenc\ to monism.
This tendency is as ancient e\'en as the Rigxeda. \\ rites Mr.
Prasad: ".V careful stud_\- of the l\ig\'eda will show that while
individual gods are adored and the xarious [)henomena of nature are
attributed to them, the need of finding one comjirehensixe unit\' anfid
all diversit}" and one fundamental cause for all the manifold causes
and eff'ects is constantly pressing itself ui)on these poet philosophers
of yore, and that as a result of this we alread\- find in the Rigveda
the theistic, the pantheistic and the monistic tendencies in iuxtaposi-
tion with the more usual and predominant pohtheistic notions."''
The monistic strain becomes much more emphatic with tlie course of
time, until, with the appearance of the I'panishads. it becomes in-
dubitably ascendent. .Vgain to quote Mr. Prasad: "For the most
part there is one conception which dominates the whole of Up-
- Garbc. Richard. Tlii' Philosophy of .hiciriif India, pp. 8t.
•^ Pra.sad, Jwala. Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 5.
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anishadic thought, viz., that there is uUimately only one principle
of reality and it is Brahman or the universal self. All diversity
and plurality of existence is either an illusion altogether or a mani-
festation of this same principle in a variety of forms."'* Even where
there is a theistic emphasis in the Upanishads there is a monistic
note in the teaching that the universe, though having its source in
Brahman, does not completely represent the latter but that l>rahman
transcends the universe.
In her philosophy India has indeed travelled upon almost all the
paths of metaphysical exploration and has expounded widely var\ -
ing doctrines of realit}'. Professor Radhakrishnan, however, has
insisted, in his valuable historical studies, that Indian philosophx
at its highest is monistic. Indeed^ in his view, even those systems
of thought that are avowedly dualistic or pluralistic have, immis-
takabh' and inevitabh', monistic implications. Xow it is only fair
to bear in mind that historical interpretations are easily colored b\
the historian's own philosophical affiliations ; and Professor Rad-
hakrishnan has been charged with having distinctly exaggerated the
extent to which monism reigns in Indian philosophy. \\'hate\er
element of truth there may be in such a charge there nc\ertheless
seems abundant evidence that, as compared with what obtains in the
contemporar}' West, the monistic doctrine, or an underlxing current
thereof, uniquely ])revails and has so prevailed, in the philosophy of
India.
This is certainly the case when one envisages the situation from
the standpoint of logical and epistemological teaching. But it is
equally clear when the matter is viewed from the angle of ethics,
especially in connection with the prc^blem of evil. Generally speak-
ing, life in the West has presented itself more in terms of struggle.
Xot nearh as striking as in India have been the tendencies to explain
away evil or to ^eek escape from it through flight or disregard.
Thus there has been a more widely prevalent as well as a sterner
ethical dualism—a dualism often so stubborn as to carr\- the da\
both in theology and in metaphysics. The g(X)d, it has conimunl\
been felt, is engaged either in an heroic defense against the in-
vasions of evil or in a spirited attack u])on it.
Often India's monism has been carried to extremes such as are
seldom found in the classical s\stems of the \\ est, and are today
non-existent in America. In some instances, however, Indian think-
ers have preserxed the aspect of diversity, setting forth the ultimate
unity, not as void of distinctions and utterly abstract, but as in-
^ //'((/., p. 11.
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elusive of. e\en though transcendent to, the differences which it
organizes and synthesizes. IVecisely as India, despite its astounding
variety of chmate, races, rehgions and civihzations, and its paradoxes
and strains, is inchned to feel itself in some profound way as one,
and often cherisiies this unity beyond all else; and precisely as,
speaking in tiie by and large, she, throughout the centuries antedating
Western control, admitted with exemplary toleration the most varied
types of religious beliefs and practices, acknowledging to all the
value of bodying forth in some fashion the one eternal
—
just so have
lier philosophies, though prevailingly monistic, nevertheless at times
sought to find place for all the vast choir of heaven and of earth.
The point, however, which we are at present concerned to make is
that in India the consciousness or realization of the ultimate or the
all-embracing unity has ever seemed peculiarl\- clear.
The experience of himself as in essence the ultimate, or as falling
within its life, or as being nought except in and through it, has been
so strong and so universal as to set the typical Indian seer and
philosopher quite apart from most of the thinkers of contemporary
.•\merica. Religion for the former could never be identified, as it
so often is by the latter, either with a certain quality of the social
consciousness or with active participation in the ethical tasks of
mankind, h'or the Hindu, it involves as an essential feature a life
liidden in the absolute, a feeling of unity with the ultimate, an over-
powering sense of the nothingness of man apart from God, along
with an assurance that God is all in all to him. The influence of this
outlook and experience we find reflected in much of India's meta-
physics.
Moreover, in the latter the emphasis falls upon being and eternal
reality, rather than upon becoming, transformation and progress in
time. How the energetic Aryan invaders originally came to substi-
tute the ideal of realization for that of aspiration, of possession for
that of search, of being for that of striving, we need not inquire.
But early indeed the shift occurred. Thereafter, prett\- much,
throughout, India's seers and thinkers, as well as her sons and
daughters generally, have been widely agreed as to the priority, alike
in theory and in life, of being over becoming. Writes Professor
Radhakrishnan : "Except the Piirva Mimaiiisa, all the systems aim
at the practical end of salvation. The systems mean by release
( moksa ) the recovery by the soul of its natural integrity, from
which sin and error drive it. All the systems have for their ideal
complete mental poise and freedom from the discords and uncer-
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tainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, "a repose that ever is thc
same,' which no doubts disturb and no rebirths break into. The con-
ception of jivanmukti, or hberation in life^ is admitted in many
schools."'' Hence it is not surprising that "all the systems protest
against the scepticism of the liuddhists, and erect a standard of ob-
iective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux. . . .
It is assumed that whatever has a beginning has an end. Ever\thing
that is made up of parts can be neither eternal nor self-subsistent.
The true individual is indivisible. The real is not the universe
extended in space and time ; for its nature is becoming and not being.
There is something dee])er than this—atoms and souls, or purusa
and prakrti, or lirahman."'''
I^^ntirely in harmony with the above is the typical Hindu view
that even philosophy, as discursive reasoning and thought activit)-.
cannot be the ultimate mode of human experience. To the latter
philosophy can be but a pathway. Indeed much the same may be
said f)f the ethical life. The one who knows, gets beyond reasoning
processes to insight and realization : the holy man transcends the
plane of moral striving where the good is a goal of effort— for him
the good is an accomplished fact, an achieved experience. In an
illuminating paper on "Approach to Metaphysics" w hich has recentl_\
appeared in The Xcz^' Era, Professor Dasgupta has touched upon
this point. In reference to metaphysical inquiry he writes:
"Whether these intellectual efforts are required ultimately to point
to some kind of solid exi)erience as the ultimate result or whether
the efforts themselves are sufficient to satisf}' the craving of the mind
in this direction, is a matter in which the Western and Indian mind.^-
are not in thorough agreement. I do not say that there is any history
of open and positive disagreement and quarrel over this matter be-
tween them, but, it seems from the history of philosophy of the two
countries, that European minds were always generally satisfied with
the theoretical and rational enquiry, whereas, the Indian minds
though they enforced strictest rational enquiry, always demanded
some real experience which could verify the net results of the intel-
lectual enquiry. With the Indian thinkers mere theoretical accuracy
of thought leading logically to a certain conclusion, was not con-
sidered to be sufficient. It is curious that there were certain
metaphysical results which they considered as being strictl}' veri-
fiable in experience, and in which all the conflicting systems of
thought, which were in hopeless quarrel over the epistemological.
•' Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Pliilosopliy, p. 26.
'•Ibid., pp. 25 f.
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ontological and logical parts of the theoretical enquir\-, were rno-il\
practically in agreement."
Hindu thinkers are therefore pretty much at one as regards theii"
ultimate objective. This consists not in an accumulation of theo-
retical truths or even in the construction of a temple of knowledge.
Truth is indeed highly prized and the vocation of the scholar is
set on a pedestal. Yet in the last analysis the value of science and
philosophy is deemed to be practical**" and religious. It is the func-
tion of these disciplines to serve and to satisfy the basic needs of
human life. Whatever the historic origin of the belief in the saving
power of knowledge," it is primaril\- because of such power that
knowledge is sought. Of the earlier thinkers, includmg the author
of the Cita, Edgerton saxs that, though frecpiently differing on
other points, the\' all agree in their fundamental attitude toward>
the objectives of speculation. These "are primarily religious rather
than philosophical"; "all Hindu philosophy has a practical aim. It
seeks the truth, but not the truth for its own sake. It is truth as a
means of human salvation that is its object, in other words, all
''•'Our exposition would seem to receive general contirmation in Prulessor
Dasgupta's recent volume, \'oija I'liilosophy in Relation to Other SystC)}is of
Indian Thonght. Here it is pointed out that the speculative features of the
V'oga philosophy were intended as a rational basis for the prescribed practises ;
their value, it is stated, is "that of a hypothesis, which, according to Yoga,
enjoys the patronage of the Upanishads and serves to explain the results of
the performance of Yoga practises." (p. 7.) It is but fair to add, however,
that the same page from which this quotation is taken, includes also the
sentence: "The Yoga . . . unlike other systems, (ital. mine) does not base it^
claims merely on the consistency of its speculative reasonings but also on a
system of practises by which the speculative results at which it arrived can i)r
directly verified." It is difficult to see how this passage can be reconciled
with that which we quoted in our text from The A'ezc Era. True, the referenc •
in the i'oc/a Philosophy is to a system of practises rather than to a direct
e.xporience of verification through realization, such as Professor Dasgupta said
in The A^"tt' Era that "Indian minds . .
.
aKvays demanded." Nevertheless, it is
difficult to see how one may logically claim, on the one hand, that Indian
systems other than the Yoga base their claims )nerely on the consistency of
their speculative reasonings and, on the other, that "Indian minds . . . always de-
manded some real experience which could verify (ital. mine) the net results of
the intellectual inquiry." What may be said, we have allowed ourselves to
claim, is that the ultimate objective of Indian philosophers has been in part to
blaze a trail for thinking minds to a non-reflective yet noetic experience, while
yet and also, in cases where this experience has been arrived at independentlx
of speculative thought, to furnish logical underpinnings for it.
" Professor Franklin Edgerton attributes it to primitive ideas of magic
which left lingering traces even when they became transcended and transfigured.
(Cf. The Bliaeiavad Cita. p, 7.) This would help to explain how it comes that
in India knowledge commonly possesses a value quality that is quite unique, .i
((uality quasi-transcendental as it were, and commanding a reverential regard
akin to that often maintained toward the mysterious and the supernatural—
a
quality that distinguishes it from what is prevalent in the West in those circles
where knowledge is construed as instrumental to needs and to practical or
spiritual ends.
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Hindu philosoph}^ is religious in basis. To the Hindu mind, 'the
truth shall make }'ou free.' Otherwise there is no virtue in it.
This is quite as true of the later systems as of the early and less
systematic speculations. To all of them knowledge is a means to
an end.'"^
The contention that Indian philosophy, while religious in basis,
is practical in aim—that its esteem for scientific and metaphysical
knowledge is due not to any independent value which such knowl-
edge is supposed to have but to the practical value ascribed to it
—
might seem prima facie to bring into conjunction terms that we set
into contrast in our foregoing exposition. For we referred to Indian
|)hilosophy as peculiarly dominated by certain features of the re-
ligious consciousness, and in so far we differentiated it from con-
temporary American culture which was said to reflect in a peculiar
degree the experiences of practical, as well as of ethical, life and
activit}'. This particular antithesis of the religious and the practical,
however, in no wise prevents bracketing together the two terms in
a descri]:)tion of the objectives of Indian philosophy. The reason for
this is simple. It resides in the different meanings carried by the
term "practical" in the two cases. In the earlier context, the term
was given its Western connotation ; now. in defining the aim of
Indian ])hilosophy. we emplo\' it differently. In the one case, its
associations are with utilitx', with particular ends to be attained, with
the relations of objects and instruments to needs and desires, and
to specific purposes realizable through courses of action ; in the other,
it refers to the satisfaction of a religious and spiritual yearning, to
an experience of the absolute, to the attainment of a salvation that
puts to rest the restless questioning of the intellect and the passionate
urge of desire.
That from which knowledge is held by typical Indian thinkers to
emancipate the individual is suffering^'' and samsara, or the cycle of
life. The bondage in this case is attributed to a peculiar form of
ignorance, an ignorance whose nature it is to misconstrue the true
character and value of things. Such ignorance is to be dispelled by
traversing the paths of philosoph\- with the aim of securing an im-
mediate realization of truth and reality. Salvation from samsara,
the supreme question of man. is found by every philosophical school
of India in some special form of cognition, ^'et there is a sense in
which philosophy as reflective thought carries us only to the portals
•** Edgertoii, Franklin, op. cit.. p. 6.
*^" C/. Dasgupta, S. N., Fof/a PhiIoso}>hy, p. 87: "The practical motive of
all systematic speculation in India was deliverance from suffering."
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of realization. The tenets common to all the philosophical systems of
India, Professor Radhakrishnan describes, almost at the outset of
his discussion, in the following sentences : "Reason is subordinated
to intuition. Life cannot be comprehended in its fulness by logical
reason. Self-consciousness is not the ultimate category of the uni-
verse. There is something transcending the consciousness of self,
to which many names are given—Intuition, Revelation. Cosmic Con-
sciousness, and God-vision. We cannot describe it adequately, so
we call it the super-consciousness. When we now and then have
glimpses of this higher form, we feel that it involves a purer illumi-
nation and a wider compass. As the difference between mere con-
sciousness and self-consciousness constitutes the wide gulf separat-
ing the animal from man, so the difference between self-conscious-
ness and super-consciousness constitutes all the difference between
man as he is and man as he ought to be. The philosoph\- of India
takes its stand on the spirit which is above mere logic, and holds
that culture based on mere logic or science ma\' be efficient, but
cannot be inspiring."""
Indian philosophies, thus, transcend, in many cases, the level of
strictly ethical experience. Or. at any rate, they carry us beyond
that which Bosanquet has aptl}' called "the realm of claims and
counter-claims." "While virtue and vice may lead to a good or
bad life within the circle of samsara, we can escape from samsara
through the transcending of the moralistic individualism."^" Taken
in conjunction with a universalistic and a cosmic perspective, this
tends to make for great breadth of sympath}' and good will. Mr.
Chenchiah goes so far as to allege : "The essence of Hinduism is
best expressed in the words of Coleridge: 'He prayeth best who
loveth best, all things both great and small." The religious m\ thology
of India is shot through and through with this tender love for all
manifestations of God. In the psalms of the Indian saints (unlike
those of the Old Testament ) there is never a hint of anger nor a
desire for revenge."
]\Ir. Chenchiah"s pronouncement is perhaps too exuberant.
Nevertheless, in some respects, as exemplified in her reverence for
and protection of the cow% Hinduism indubitably senses the oneness
of all forms of life. Moreover. Hinduism has exhibited a rare
hospitality to alien faiths ; it has to a considerable degree included
and taken up within herself various bodies of worshippers with
^* Radhakrishnan, S.. Indian Pliilflsophy. p. 25.
iO//';Vy., p. 27.
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different ^ods and forms of cult, ha\ ing been receptive, indeed, even
to those for whom all g'ods are but subjective creations of finite
mind : it has exercised a measure of religious toleration that
brightens the annals of mankind. On the other hand, it must not
be overlooked that humans are humans. They live not on or by
creeds and insights alone. In practice, India has had and continues
to have much bitter religious strife. .Alike the Jains of the south
and the IJuddhists variously', as in Nepal and Orissa, ha\e much to
complain of regarding persecution b\- Hindus. Far worse still haw
been the sufferings inflicted b\- I lindus upon low caste co-religionists.
ICven the great philosopher .^ankara cpiotes with ap])roval the law
books wliich i)rescribe that, if a Sudra overhears the X'edic chants,
his ears are to be tilled with lead: if he utters verses from the Veda,
his tongue is to be cut oft"; and if he touches a copy of the \ edas,
his body is to be dismembered. Aspiration to be a hermit subjects
the .Sudra to i)ersecution. Indeed, the Ramaxana re])orts that the
god Rama beheaded Sambuka, a Sudra, because he had practiced
penance, and the other gods are said to have been jubilant over
what Rama had done.
In the life—and, indeed, e\en in the thought
—
oi India, as else-
where, there thus are clashing elements. lUit it is worth noting that
Ilitiduism ])cacefully shelters within herself extremeb' diverse ])oint-
of view in relation to gods and no-gods, as well as to worshiji and
the cultivation of emotions. AForeover, the typical Hindu as})ires
to transcend the plane of narrow individualism and to attain to a
cosmic ])ers])ecti\ e wherein e\cr\thing hiiite is given ])lace within
an all-inclusive whole and is through >uch membershi]), or as an
ex]M"ession of the t(jtality, \ested with such reality and \alue, if any,
as it ma\' be deemed to have. These features operate strongly
towards the expansion of svmpathies and the exercise of tolerance
in religion and philosophic views, as well as in the attitudes both
reflected and cultivated b\- them.
.Kristoxenus tells the stor\- of a \isit paid to Socrates b\ an
Indian philosopher. When the immortal (^reek told the latter that
he dexoted himself to the studx' of man and human affairs, he is
said to have recei\ed a smile and the reply that no one could under-
stand things human who did not understand things divine. \\ hether
or not this stor\- has any foundati(Mi in fact, it illustrates the ]ir(i-
found conviction of Indian philosophers generally that there is a
reality undisclosed by sense and that this reality affords the ke\-
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for sucli comprehension as may he possihle of that wliich eng-ages
the tliought of man.
The population of India generall\ has disphayed an acute sen>e
of the inhnite and a rc\erent devotion to the unseen. It has felt
that onl\- in this perspecti\e might one understand i)articular things
and events, and onK' in this light should one direct one"s life. Mar-
garet E. C\)usins, writing on "The WOmanhood of India." has
recently said: "OnK- those who ha\e li\ed long and intimatel\
amongst the women of India can appreciate the change that is
flooding their lives hearing them forth to freedom, literacy creati\e
activit}- of all kinds, and all tinctured, nay. si)rung from the foun-
tain of spiritual realization, for the Indian woman's source of
strength is ever her sense of the Eternal." Drawing on a larger
canvas, Mr. P. Chenchiah has given us the following sketch: "The
pursuit of the inhnite, the search of the unknown has heen the main
pre-cjccujjation of India all through the ages. The pageant of India
—benevolent rulers, far-famed conquerors, learned pundits, incom-
parable philosophers, great poets and singers ; i)alaces, palm-shaded
villages and populous towns,— all these are in the picture. Hut in
the center are the Sadhu and the Rishi (seeri, the searchers after
truth. All Indian arts, crafts and sciences are born of her religion.
Indian music is the praise of the gods, Indian jjainting their portrait
galler\', Indian architecture their temi)les. Amidst a thousand voices,
all attractixe and charming. India followed the trail of the lirahman.
the myster_\- of (lod as it emerges in liuman consciousne-> and
history."
Eor our present purp(jses it is indifferent what ma_\ be the specific
fcjrms in which the con\iction of the inhnite has receix ed i)hilosophic
expression. Some there were, for example, who held the \iew that
being possesses a depth which is unfathomable by the instrumentali-
ties of abstract thought. (Jthers, again, insisted upon a ty])e of
reality which, though doignated as imknown. the\' nexertheless
ardenth' longed in some wa\' to capture ;md to express. Howexer
\aried the formulations, wt- tind in India, to a degree unknown in
the West, a sense of the inhnite, and thi- it is which not mereh
permeates wide reaches of her life l)ut likewise dominates much of
her philosophy.
Xow we of America too are actively engaged in the search for
the unknown. Xever before in our history has so much importance
been attached to discovery or so much energy and resourcefulness
been displa\ed in research. Thi-; is true of our uni\ersitie> and
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technological institutions, and it finds exemplification also in numer-
ous organizations which are sustained exclusively for purposes of
scientific investigation. Indeed, even some of our larger industries
liave set up well equipped laboratories and stafl:'ed them with highl\
trained specialists in numerous fields not onl}' of applied but also
of the pure sciences. But in the main the unknown which is in
these cases the object of the quest is equivalent essentially to the
not yet known. It is continuous with that of which we possess clear
knowledge, (^ften. indeed, it is conceived as of a ]>iece with the
perceptual order. The latter is in such cases commonly given a
twofold nMe : that of setting the problems with which reason should
occupy itself and that also of \alidating or negating the conclusions
which reason proposes.
Among India's thinkers we find some who are fascinated by the
natural and psychological orders of perceptual and introspective ex-
l)erience, and who are very fearful of any departure from the lead-
ings of modern science. And, on the other hand, there are philos-
i^phers of contemporary America who are stressing the extent of the
unknown and are insisting that, as the latter enters knowledge, much
or all of what has been accepted as true will require revision ; there
are those who are sensitive to the limitations of that which is ever
actually knowable, even though it be not in principle unknowable.
Thus, India has thinkers who exemplif\- the dominant Western
traits and America has those who in some measure embody char-
acteristics common in India. Hence outer wings of Indian and
American thought tend to meet. Yet even in these cases closer
scrutiny will disclose diiferences arising from divergent matrices.
In their central, their most characteristic and potent, features, the
unknown, the infinite and the real being of which large numbers in
India have always had some form of consciousness and for which
they have maintained an intense longing, are very different indeed
from an\thing that commands wide attention on the part of our intel-
lectual explorers even in the field of philosophy.
The contrast thus alleged may receive further illumination
through another which is closely related thereto and to which we
now pass, l-'rom the days of the \'edas on down, we find closel}'
asscjciated with the consciousness of the essential mysterv of things,
a restless feeling of wonder. In the earliest time, this experience
was aroused b\' physical nature, whose awesome features in India
are ])eculiarly fitted to exercise such an influence. .Vt a later period,
the sense of m\ster\- and the associated wonder were stimulated
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 597
more especially by subtle stirrings and forebodings within the self.
Xow the wonder thus aroused has a quality that not merely impels
the mind beyond what is alread\' grasped to something essentially
similar thereto, as does that form of wonder which prevails in the
America of today. The wonder of the Indian is one akin to that
involved in the religious consciousness, one that engenders a rela-
tion to a reality genuinely, and in some very significant sense quali-
tatively, distinct from the ph\sical and the psychological factors
arousing it. I am not sure but what the latter rather than the former
represents the experience of Kant when contemplating the starry
heavens above and the moral law within. If so, those interpreters
of the Koenigsberger have a point in their favour who construe
his doctrine of noumena and things-in-themselves not in terms
of the limits of the given, as does the Marburg School, but in a much
more dualistic fashion. Or again, consider what Plato meant when
he described wonder as "the mark of the genuine philosopher so
that he was no bad geneologist who said that Iris is the child of
wonder." Contrast this with the wonder described by Comte in a
passage which declares that this is man's deepest motivation, and
that no suffering can be more acute than the consternation arising
from the thought that some event may happen in violation of the
laws of phenomena. This wonder is that of the scientists, the posi-
tivists, and certain of the empirical philosophers. From it we must
distinguish that to which Carlyle referred when he contended that
"He who cannot and does not wonder (and worship) were he Presi-
dent of innumerable Royal Societies and possessed the epitome of
Hegel's philosophy and the knowledge of all the laboratories and
observatories of modern Europe within his single head, he who does
not perpetually wonder is but a pair of spectacles behind wdiich there
is no eye." Now this w'onder which for Plato constitutes the mark
of a genuine philosopher, which was in all probability associated
with the awe and reverence aroused in Kant by the starry heavens
and the ethical imperative, and which, in Carlyle's phrase, dis-
tinguishes a seeing eye from glassy spectacles is, if my limited
knowledge may be trusted, precisely what w-e find to an exceptional
degree among the seers and thinkers of India's many centuries. To-
gether with Plato and the major philosophers of medieval Europe,
they powerfully strengthen the conviction of those who, despite
much of unquestionable value in the thought of contemporary
America, find therein limitations connected with the functioning of
what William James labelled the thick-skinned mind.
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riie drawing of contrasts is theoretically perilous, especiallx
when one is dealing with matters as conii)lex as philosophy and
culture. Nevertheless, it is hoped that enough will have been said
to iustif\- the affirmation that Indian })hilosophy diverges in signifi-
cant ways from the spirit and the thought currents of the con-
temporar\- West, and to render at least plausible the thesis that the
dififerences which present themselves arise in no small measure from
the more intimate relationship which the life and the speculative
thought of India have maintained with the deliverances of the re-
ligious consciousness. The chief j)oints which we have sought to
make might be summarized as follows: In respect to the feeling of
wonder, the concept of practical, and the value attached to knowl-
edge, there are significant dififerences between the spirit of Jndia and
that of present-da\' America ; and in each case these differences arise
fr(^m the greater prominence in the Indian mind of a sense of the
infinite and of the religious note. Indian philosophv has its orienta-
tion in the relation of the self and the world ; its goal is not abstract
knowledge but a characteristic type of experience. Its aims are
|)ractical
—
])ractical, liowever. not in the sense of enhancing man's
])0\ver o\er the material or the social environment, or of realizing
ends of a purely or narrowly ethical sort, l)Ut in the sense of sati'—
f\ing the more ultimate need of salvation. It thus transcends the
])Iane of moralitw In distinction from the centrifugal philosoph}
of an "expanding will" which, at its best, centers about the ])erfect-
ing of societx' and its world, the ])hil()S()phy of India turns to a
sui)ernature discoverable in the recesses of the human soul and
suggesting the need for spiritual realization. Its emphasis is upon
being rather than becoming. In opposition to doctrines of flux, it
stresses an objective reality that furnishes an absolute standard of
truth and of spiritual values. The individual aspires to an over-
] towering exj^erience of the ultimate, and the philosopher is inclined
to a metaphysical monism which looks beyond particulars to a whole
or a totality within which they fall. Power and goodness are con-
joined in the concept of karma. We thus have a marked divergence
from the temporalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism, and
I)luralism which are so prominent in the contemporary West, and
from those analytic and intellectualistic strains that pervade so
many of its philosophies. -. •
